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Iran-Linked Ships Lingered Over Gulf of Oman Internet Cables as Tehran Threatened Them

RAGE Global · Gulf of Oman · Subsea cables · Reported · 7 min read

By Carlos KfouryPublished

Slide 01 of 09

  1. Cover, Gulf of Oman and Iran, 6 November 2026, reported by the FT and Windward. A schematic map of the Gulf of Oman between Oman and Iran shows cable routes and four numbered vessel areas: 1 off Sohar, 2 off Muscat, 3 between Jask and Chabahar, 4 off Jask. Headline: "Iran-linked ships lingered over Gulf of Oman cables." Four vessels slowed, looped and went dark above undersea internet routes.

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Four Iran-linked vessels slowed, looped and switched off their tracking signals above undersea internet cables in the Gulf of Oman between 5 and 28 October 2026, according to the Financial Times, citing data from the maritime intelligence firm Windward. Three are U.S.-sanctioned tankers. One of them, CELESTIAL SEA, went dark for 86 hours inside the 2Africa and BBG cable corridors off Sohar, Oman. The activity overlapped with a run of Iranian warnings that Gulf cables could be hit if the war resumes. Windward says the movements fit the profile of mapping the cable routes or placing charges on them, but that tracking data alone cannot show what the ships did.

Key takeaways

  • Four vessels, one corridor: three U.S.-sanctioned tankers and an Iran-flagged fishing-support ship lingered over cable routes off Oman's Batinah coast and Iran's Makran coast, 5–28 October, Windward data shows.
  • 86 hours dark: CELESTIAL SEA switched off its tracking signal inside the 2Africa and BBG corridors off Sohar, 15–19 October.
  • Seven cable systems run through these waters, linking the Gulf to Asia, Africa, Europe and Australia.
  • The threats: an Iranian official warned on 12 October that cables could be hit; the IRGC spokesman named "seven major internet cables" under Hormuz on 19 October; two Iranian officials told Reuters on 23 October that Tehran has detailed plans to hit them if war resumes.
  • The limit: Windward says ship-tracking data cannot show whether any vessel surveyed the seabed or deployed equipment.

Confidence: REPORTED. The vessel movements come from Windward's analysis of ship-tracking (AIS) data, reported by the Financial Times. RAGE X has not independently examined the tracking data. The Iranian statements are reported as statements.

What the data shows#

Windward tracked four vessels that slowed, changed course or stopped over cable routes in the Gulf of Oman from 5 to 28 October. Three of them remained dark, with their Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders off, when Windward published its analysis on 29 October.

Vessel Type What Windward reports
CELESTIAL SEA Sanctioned products tanker Looped for 4.3 hours about 0.65 nautical miles from 2Africa on 14 October, then went dark for 86 hours inside the 2Africa and BBG corridors off Sohar, 15–19 October
Gas carrier (VLGC) Sanctioned, laden with LPG; name withheld Left Shinas for Malaysia on 23 October, slowed over 2Africa, turned 180 degrees back toward Oman and went dark about 2 nautical miles from AAE-1
Supertanker (VLCC) Iran-flagged, operated by the state-run NITC; name withheld Loitered at under 1 knot for about 10 days in Iran's exclusive economic zone between Jask and Chabahar, 0.4–3 nautical miles from four cable routes; dark since 26 October
Fishing-support ship 34 m, Iran-flagged; owner unknown Drifted along the EIG and TW1 routes on 21–24 October, in waters Windward says it had not entered before; dark in Iranian waters since 26 October

According to Windward, CELESTIAL SEA came back on air about 9 nautical miles from where it disappeared, then made a U-turn, instead of waiting at an anchorage as a tanker normally would. Windward links the ship to a UAE-based operator that, according to the U.S. Treasury, moved oil for the National Iranian Oil Company and, in 2023, for the Iranian military.

Windward also reports that the fishing-support ship crossed the FALCON and UAE–Iran cables on 25 October, the day before it went dark.

Why this corridor matters#

Seven cable systems pass through the waters where the vessels operated: 2Africa, BBG (Bay of Bengal Gateway), AAE-1, OAC, EIG, TW1 and SeaMeWe-4. Together they link the Gulf states to Asia, Africa, Europe and Australia. Their owners include Meta, Vodafone, Orange, AT&T, Verizon, BT, China Mobile, China Telecom, Reliance Jio, Omantel and e&.

The Batinah routes off Oman carry 2Africa, BBG, AAE-1 and OAC. The Makran routes off Iran carry EIG, TW1, BBG and SeaMeWe-4.

Windward's wider analysis of the Strait of Hormuz finds that Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar have no subsea route to the outside world that avoids the strait, because every cable they use lands inside the Gulf. Windward counts six live systems crossing Hormuz itself, with two more due in 2027. Two of them, FALCON and GBI, also land in Iran, according to Windward, so cutting them would also sever Iran's own links.

What "going dark" means#

Large ships broadcast their position, course and speed by AIS. Switching the transponder off hides the track: the ship's last known position is all an observer has until it transmits again. Sanctioned tankers often go dark to hide cargo transfers. Over a cable route, a ship that slows, loops and lingers with its AIS off could, in principle, be surveying the seabed or deploying equipment without being seen.

The moves and the threats#

Date Event Type
12 Oct Iranian official Mohsen Rezaei warns that cables and data centres across the region could be hit if the war resumes Warning
14–15 Oct CELESTIAL SEA loops near 2Africa, then goes dark for 86 hours off Sohar Vessel
19 Oct IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi says seven major internet cables run under the Strait of Hormuz and warns of "new targets" Warning
21–24 Oct The fishing-support ship drifts along the EIG and TW1 routes Vessel
23 Oct Two senior Iranian security officials tell Reuters that Tehran has detailed plans to hit Gulf undersea cables if the U.S. and Israel attack Iran again. The same day, the gas carrier turns back over 2Africa Both
26 Oct The VLCC and the fishing-support ship go dark; both are still dark in Windward's 29 October report Vessel

The officials who spoke to Reuters gave few specifics and did not say how or where Iran would strike. One said that if Iran were attacked "there will be no more red lines," and that Tehran would also try to block repairs to damaged cables. Neither Iran's Foreign Ministry nor the U.S. State Department responded to Reuters' requests for comment.

Mapping the cables, or a coincidence?#

Windward says cargo logistics do not explain the vessels' moves, which fit the profile of mapping cable routes or placing charges while dark.

It is equally clear about the limits. Ship-tracking data alone cannot show whether any of the vessels surveyed the seabed or deployed equipment. The area is a busy fishing ground, and ships waiting off Shinas sit near the cables anyway. Windward says further loitering of the same kind would be needed to show a pattern rather than a coincidence.

No cable in the Gulf of Oman has been reported damaged, and no government has accused Iran of tampering with one.

Our read · RAGE Intel assessment

The movements are unexplained, not proven hostile. Four Iran-linked ships behaving this way over the same cables, in the same weeks that Tehran named those cables as targets, is a pattern worth watching closely. But tracking data shows where ships were, not what they did, and the most important question, whether anything was surveyed or placed on the seabed, cannot be answered from it.

The threats themselves read as deterrence aimed at the Gulf states and at Washington: raising the cost of renewed strikes on Iran by putting the region's internet and the investments that depend on it on the table. Two of the systems that cross Hormuz also serve Iran, which limits how freely it could cut them.

This is an assessment, not a finding. It will change if a cable is damaged, if the dark ships reappear in the same corridors, or if a government makes a formal accusation.

What to watch#

  • Where the dark ships reappear, and whether the cable corridors were a destination or a stop on the way.
  • Further loitering by sanctioned Iran-linked tankers over the Batinah corridors.
  • New IRGC statements on the cables, alongside any repeat of the pattern.

This story is developing. RAGE X will update it as new information is confirmed.

Sources#

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